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Bridging t h e  gap between r e sea rche r s  and pract i t ioners  through the  creat ing 
of opportunities f o r  exchange of ideas and experience is one of t he  main aims of 
t he  PIN project.  One of t h e  problems to  be  dealt  with in this connection is  t he  
difference in world view and problem-structuring tha t  exists between practition- 
e r s ,  who are participants in negotiations, and researchers ,  who are observers .  
Thus bridging the  gap i s  not just a matter of t ransferr ing more actively r e sea rch  
resul ts  and lessons from experience. I t  must also affect research  design, and 
ideally this should involve both pract i t ioners  and researchers .  
This paper  of Laurent Mermet discusses the  issue a t  t h e  level of t he  paradigms 
through which, implicitly o r  explicitly, negotiation research  s t ruc tu re s  the  object 
of i ts  inquiries. I t  points ou t  fundamental reasons which give t h e  game paradigm 
-in a very wide sense- a unique capability t o  s t ruc tu re  t h e  reflections of both 
r e sea rche r s  and pract i t ioners  in a way tha t  helps to facili tate and enhance the i r  
mutual communication and understanding. 
The issue i s  analysed h e r e  in an abs t r ac t  perspective, but t h e  conclusions 
point t o  a range of applications in debriefing methodology, applied r e sea rch  and 
training. a n  example of such a n  application is  presented in detail in another  work- 
ing paper  issued in parallel  with t h e  present  one: On Getting Simulation Models 
Used in International Negotiations - A Debriefing Exercise; L. Mermet, L. Hordijk. 
Dr. Frances Mautner-Markhof 
Principal Investigator 
Processes of International Negotiations 
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An analytical framework to  bridge the 
pract i t ioner-researcher  gap in negotiation r e sea rch  
Laurent  Mermet 
Introduction 
This paper  focuses on a discussion of t he  five major paradigms cur ren t ly  
involved in negotiation research :  mechanism, process ,  system, field, and game. It 
scans t he i r  respect ive potential t o  cope with two challenges of negotiation 
research .  The f i r s t  i s  t o  bridge t h e  gap between pract i t ioners  and r e sea rche r s .  
The second i s  t o  clarify t h e  ambiguity, p resen t  in most analysis, between those 
character is t ics  of a negotiation which stem out of t he  specifics of t h e  problem 
being negotiated, and those which per ta in  generally t o  t h e  negotiation process  
itself. 
The discussion will show tha t  t h e  game paradigm, although cur ren t ly  less sys- 
tematically used than t h e  o thers ,  has  a unique capacity in both these  respects .  I t  
needs; however, a thorough reexamination, t o  which much of the  pape r  i s  dedi- 
cated. Our conclusion is  t h a t  a systematic reflection on, and utilization of t h e  
game paradigm, provide a sound basis fo r  a wide range  of applications which can 
b e  labelled Game Analysis, and are quite useful in negotiation r e sea rch  and o the r  
similar fields in which the  pract i t ioners '  present  and past  experience is  a crucial  
factor .  
T h e  r e s e a r c h e r - p r a c t i t i o n e r  g a p  
Discussions on the  basic problems of negotiation r e sea rch ,  such as those sur-  
rounding t h e  launching of t h e  PIN research  project ,  have underlined two major 
difficulties tha t  t h e  negotiation r e sea rch  field will have t o  face. 
The f i r s t  i s  t h e  gap existing between r e s e a r c h e r s  on the  one side and practi-  
t ioners on the  o t h e r  (1). I t  can  be  sketched by just two questions: the  one t ha t  
pract i t ioners  ask about analysts: "is he  really useful?" and the  one asked by 
analysts about practit ioners:  "do they realize what they are actually doing?" 
Why is there such a gap? 
P a r t  of t h e  answer i s  certainly in obstacles of a contingent nature .  One is  t h e  
r a r i t y  of opportunities to m e e t .  Another is t h e  fact t h a t  r e s e a r c h e r s  and practi-  
t ioners  live practically in t w o  sepa ra t e  worlds widely differing in values, in 
methods, in language, in time constraints,  in incentive systems .... To overcome 
such contingent obstacles,  i t  i s  necessary t o  foster communication through 
workshops and conferences,  to provide incentives f o r  t h e  application of r e sea rch  
work, and for t h e  sharing of t he i r  experience by practit ioners.  The PIN network 
and the  PIN Conference are such efforts.  
But beyond this  level of contingent difficulties, t h e r e  i s  a deepe r  ground f o r  
t he  practice-analysis gap, which is  t ha t  some of t he  world-views r e s e a r c h e r s  base  
t he i r  analysis upon can  b e  held only f r o m  an  uninvolved r e s e a r a h e r s s  position, and 
cannot b e  used by par t ic ipants  in t h e  phenomena they describe.  Reciprocally, 
some descriptions of t he i r  own experience by pract i t ioners  are "formatted" in a 
way tha t  makes them difficult or even practically impossible f o r  r e sea rche r s '  use. 
In o t h e r  terms, to establish fruitful actor-observer  collaboration, i t  i s  indispensi- 
ble  t ha t  both t h e  pract i t ioner  and the  analyst ope ra t e  within a framework of refer- 
ence,  o r  analytical framework, such tha t  what they experience and discover will 
possibly b e  exchanged and eventually synthesized. 
Such a framework will have to fulfill, amongst o t h e r  things, t h e  following 
m a j o r  condition: i t  must b e  ab le  to accommodate both t he  points of view of t h e  
involved participant,  and t h a t  of t he  r a t h e r  detached observer ,  on t h e  same situa- 
tion. 
T h e  c o n t e n t - p r o c e s s  ambigui ty  
A second difficulty in negotiation r e sea rch  is  t ha t  t he  aim of negotiation is  not 
only to agree ,  but both to a g r e e  and solve a cer ta in  problem. Negotiatiors are, at 
t h e  same time, managing t h e  negotiation tact ics  and s t ra tegies ,  and addressing t h e  
par t icular  problem which is  t he  content of t h e  negotiation. So  to a l a rge  extent ,  
much of what they do i s  actually s t ruc tured  by the  problem itself. This is  a diffi- 
culty for negotiation research :  ideally, one would l ike to  b e  able  to isolate pat- 
t e r n s  of negotiation which are independent of t h e  problem being negotiated. But 
when doing r e sea rch ,  one is  f a r  from tha t  ideal. 
In a case study on a negotiation, much of t he  process  descr ibed is  linked to 
the  content of t h e  negotiation. It i s  difficult, f o r  example. t o  adopt a general  
methodology f o r  such studies, beyond adopting a check-list on some information 
one would like to find as standard fea tures  in a case-study. This has  led some his- 
torians and policy-science r e sea rche r s  to question the  specificity of negotiation 
research  (2). 
The same problem exists,  at the  o t h e r  extreme of t he  r e s e a r c h  field, in formal 
theoretical studies on negotiation, and in par t icu la r  in game theory.  When w e  
speak of ze ro  or non-zero sum games f o r  instance, w e  r e f e r  not t o  the  negotiation 
process,  but to t he  s t ruc tu re  of t he  problem being negotiated. The message con- 
cerns negotiation r a t h e r  indirectly: "in the  negotiation process ,  do not mistake 
non-zero sum situations f o r  ze ro  sum ones." From this  point, the  r e sea rch  work 
splits in t w o  divergent directions. The f i r s t  i s  a s ea rch  fo r  solutions and optimums 
through mathematics, which is  a typical case  of t h e  s t ruc tu re  of t h e  problem pro- 
viding a proposed process .  Incidentally, this  work applies not specifically to nego- 
tiations, but to all processes  tha t  can  address  t he  considered problem. The second 
t rend  of r e sea rch  i s  a prac t ica l  reflexion on: how to r each  solutions suggested by 
the  s t ruc tu re  of t he  problem, but in t he  setting of real negotiations (3)? This is  a 
qualitative reflection, often useful, but vulnerable to a questioning of whether this  
is science, or c lever  self-help. 
To sum up, the  difficulty of articulating analysis of p rocess  and of content i s  a 
durable stumbling s tone in t h e  constitution of a coherent  and specific negotiation 
r e sea rch  field. 
Questioning paradigms in negotiation research 
To deal  b e t t e r  with these difficulties, negotiation r e sea rch  will have to be  
partly re-examined, but at what level? 
There are indeed t w o  main sepa ra t e  levels of products  in t h e  field: 
- case studies and experimental work are concerned with empirical facts. If 
t he  work is  w e l l  done, t he  fac t s  they state will receive agreement of all. But 
t he  lessons they teach - and thus t he i r  usefulness - will be  a matter of 
interpretation, grounded out of t he  case  o r  t he  experiment itself, and thus 
very debatable.  
- theoretical and pragmatic generalizations are concerned with t he  charac-  
ter is t ics  of all ,  or of complete classes of negotiations. Here,  generality of 
statements is  a promise of usefulness, tempered however by the  possible lack 
of agreement on the  validity of the  statements. 
These t w o  levels of "products" imply t he  existence of t w o  o the r  levels of work: 
- methodology, which concerns t h e  articulation of fac t  and theory,  of case and 
general statement. The issue Is e i ther  how to identify or fabr icate  a case 
which will prove or disprove a general  statement, or reciprocally,  how to find 
rules  on how to derive valid generalizations from a case or set of cases. 
Without sound methodology, case studies are bound to multiply but  remain 
fruit less,  and theories  to expand but s tay aloof from application. 
- paradigms, which are t he  basic concepts through which t h e  negotiation situa- 
tion is pre-s t ructured,  or perceived, even before  i t  is discussed, be  i t  on a 
case or on a theoret ical  basis. When w e  descr ibe character is t ics  of t he  nego- 
tiation process ,  o r  system, or game, w e  do not just descr ibe t he  pat terns  w e  
have identified in our case study or theoret ical  reflexions, but w e  also assign 
to negotiation t he  s t ruc tu re  of a process,  a system, a game. The s t ructur ing 
provided by a paradigm rests on a fundamental metaphor, even if concepts 
like mechanism and process  have become so used in a l l  fields of social science 
t ha t  i t  is hardly sti l l  realized tha t  they are a transposition of physics and 
chemistry respectively into t h e  social world. However, t he  understanding 
provided will find both i ts  basis and i ts  limits in those of these  metaphors. The 
existing lparadigms provide al ternat ive basic world-views or analytical 
frameworks, which will communicate t he i r  various character is t ics  to all t he  
products of negotiation-research. 
Since what is sought h e r e  is  a n  analytical framework bridging t h e  gap in 
world-views between pract i t ioners  and r e sea rche r s  and clarifying the  s t ruc tu re  of 
t he  content-process articulation, i t  is this paradigmatic level of negotiation 
research  which will have to b e  addressed first .  
The consequences f o r  theory,  methodology, and thus case studies will der ive 
from tha t  effort .  
What a r e ,  indeed, t h e  main paradigms underlying negotiation r e sea rch?  
Mechankn 
The structuring of a situation provided by the  mechanism paradigm i s  simple: 
agent A-acts-on patient B- with result  R. The deep metaphor is  clear:  i t  i s  that  of 
the  most elementary action like cutting bread into pieces, o r  painting someting 
green. The same paradigm grounds t he  cause-effect relationship. 
Needless t o  say, this  paradigm i s  almost everywhere. How w e l l  does i t  serve 
negotiation r e sea rch?  There are two basic ways t o  use the  paradigm in the  field. 
The f i r s t  i s  t o  consider t he  negotiator as t he  agent. his opponent a s  the  
patient. and negotiation as the  agent doing things t o  the  patient to get  cer ta in  
results.  I t  i s  a conception of negotiation as a manipulation(4). 
The pract ical  limitation of this conception is  obvious: i t  requires  tha t  one 
negotiator b e  much m o r e  clever ,  o r  powerful tha t  t he  other .  This i s  generally not 
the  case in negotiations. 
This pract ical  limit comes from the  following limits of the  paradigm: 
- thinking in t e r m s  of mechanism does not allow to  consider feed-back - tha t  is, 
the  patient affecting the  agent,  
- thinking in t e r m s  of mechanism cannot take  a variable context into account: 
this is t he  classical "ceteris paribus" clause. 
Negotiation is  basically interactive,  and extremely sensitive t o  dynamic con- 
texts.  I t  i s  thus c l ea r  tha t  one has  t o  - and does - r e s o r t  t o  paradigms o t h e r  than 
mechanism-manipulation. 
The second possible use of t h e  mechanism concept is  t o  consider (a) the  nego- 
tiation as the  patient, (b) someone who wants t o  improve the  negotiation as t he  
agent, and (c) improvement as t h e  resul t  of action based on some understanding of 
a causal relation. This is t he  impact approach f o r  instance in t he  following prob- 
lematique: What effects  will various types of facilitation interventions have on 
negotiations (5)? Here t he  paradigm is more promising, because t he  dissymetry i t  
implies is  present  in t he  real situation. Hopefully t he  intervenor has  the  advantage 
of training and of a relatively detached perspective,  at least  a s  lucid as the  nego- 
t iators ' ;  o r  the  authority manipulating a negotiation on which i t  i s  responsible has  
enough power to do so. However, t he  paradigm will st i l l  find its limitations in t he  
complexity of negotiation, a complexity which the l inear chains of mechanism can- 
not adequately accommodate. To address  the mechanisms of intervention, one will 
st i l l  have t o  resort t o  analysis based on more complex paradigms. 
This i s  r e g r e t t a b l e  because  t h e  mechanism paradigm has  a g r e a t  advantage t o  
bridge t h e  theory-pract ice  gap. Describing how t h e  mechanism works te l ls  what 
t h e  agent  can  d o  to influence it. This works wonders in t h e  love s t o r y  between bio- 
physico-chemical sc iences  and technology, a love-story t h a t  h a s  not ye t  begun 
between process  - or system - based social  sc ience approaches  and t h e i r  poten- 
t ia l  users ,  f o r  r easons  t h a t  t h e  discussion below on o t h e r  paradigms will help clar- 
ify. 
Process and systan 
P r o c e s s  and system can  b e  b e s t  t r e a t e d  toge ther  h e r e .  They are re la ted  dee- 
ply, and in a way t h a t  gives them t h e  same p r o s  and cons with r e g a r d  t o  t h e  
resea rch-prac t i ce  gap  and  t h e  content- p rocess  ambiguity. Both t h e  p rocess  and 
system paradigms install t h e  same basic s t r u c t u r e :  state of a f fa i r s  S1 leads to 
state of a f f a i r s  S2 (which in t u r n  leads  t o  S3, etc ...). In t h e  p r o c e s s  image, e a c h  
state of a f f a i r s  is consti tuted of elements with a t t r ibu tes ;  t h e  transformation 
resu l t s  from interact ion of elements. In t h e  system image, t h e  focus i s  on  t h e  glo- 
bal  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  state of a f f a i r s  ( the  system), of which elements and t h e i r  a t t r i -  
butes  are only components; i t  i s  t h e  charac te r i s t i c s  of t h e  state of a f f a i r s  itself 
(not just of t h e  elements) t h a t  will shape  t h e  transformation.  In both images, t h e r e  
i s  some room (though limited) f o r  influences of some contextual  f a c t o r s  ("external" 
factors) .  
The p r o c e s s  paradigm i s  widely used in negotiation resea rch(6) .  I t  h a s  even  
made i t s  way into t h e  name of t h e  IIASA PIN program. The elements of a state of 
a f f a i r s  are t h e  negot ia tors  with t h e i r  a t t r ibu tes  ( in teres ts ,  cul tura l  s ty le ,  ...) and 
some elements of t h e  si tuation itself: s takes ,  r u l e s  of p rocedure ,  etc ... Negotia- 
tion then consists  in a t ransformation of t h e  initial si tuation through successive 
transformations brougth about  by in teract ions  and ex te rna l  f a c t o r s  until t h e  final 
s t age ,  t h e  outcome. i s  reached.  This view is  so pervasive  as t o  seem to b e  a 
s t r a i g h t  descr ipt ion of rea l i ty  i tself ;  as will b e  seen,  i t  i s  not  beyond cr i t ique and  
discussion. 
A f i r s t  limit of t h e  p r o c e s s  paradigm i s  t h a t  i t  c a n  accommodate only limited 
complexity. With two, t h r e e ,  f o u r  negotiators in one o r  t w o  in teract ion scenes ,  i t  
i s  productive to follow t h e  line of transformation of t h e  p rocess ,  and to trace back 
i t s  p roper t i e s  to elements, a t t r ibu tes ,  and f a c t o r s  in t h e  negotiation. However, 
with hundreds  of negotiators,  and s e v e r a l  o r  many interdependent in teract ion 
scenes, this view is no longer productive. The line of transformation is ha rde r  to  
follow, and above all, i t s  character is t ics  often cannot be  t raced back t o  any identi- 
fied elements, but only t o  t he  overall s t ruc ture  of t he  situation at a given move- 
ment - thus the  necessary replacement of the  process by the  system paradigm t o  
address  complex multi- par ty  multi-issue negotiations (7). In brief,  the  process 
paradigm is  f i t  t o  descr ibe negotiations of limited complexity, and the  system para- 
digm t o  the  more complex ones. In both cases,  the  situation is viewed in terms of a 
successive transformations of a structured state of affairs. 
How do these two paradigms perform in terms of t he  two concerns underlined 
ear l ier :  t he  research-practice gap, and the  process- content ambiguity? 
A s  concerns t h e  research-practice gap, they imply a contradiction between 
the  observer 's and the  participant 's  world views. The observer 's  ideal would be  
tha t  if h e  knew the  state of affairs  S at step s ,  he  would be  able  t o  deduce what will 
happen, and what t he  state of affairs  S 1  will be at step s+l. For t h e  participant t o  
p repa re  action, i t  must be  the  case tha t  S+1  depends as largely as possible on 
what he  does. The same will be  t r u e  f o r  all participants: they will s t r ive  not t o  be 
subjected t o  t he  situation: good s trategic  action generates  unpredictability. I t  is  
only a f t e r  t h e  negotiation has  occured that  both practit ioners and r e sea rche r s  
can ag ree  on a description and interpretation of what has  happened. Process  and 
systems are grea t  paradigms f o r  descriptive case  studies. But they are a poor 
basis f o r  t h e  preparat ion of action, and thus, f o r  validatable understanding of how 
negotiation works. 
Process  and system paradigms are also problematic from the  point of view of 
process-context ambiguity. A s  a n  example, one can imagine two countries negotiat- 
ing over  t h e  management of a r iver .  Suppose also tha t  t h e  negotiatons are pro- 
t rac ted  so  tha t  t h e  evolution of t he  river-problem with time will affect  t h e  negotia- 
tion, and the  negotiation process will in r e tu rn  have an  impact on r ive r  manage- 
ment, and thus on the  evolution of t h e  r iver  problem. How should this situation be  
s t ructured? The r iver ,  s o  t h e  bio-physico-chemical sciences tell  us, is  adequately 
represented by a bio-physico-chemical system (undergoing, if one wishes, a 
transformation process). Should r ive r  and negotiation be mixed into a wider nego- 
tiation system? Should t h e  r ive r  be viewed as a specific sub-system of a wider 
"negotiation on the  r iver"  system? Should the  negotiation process be viewed as 
connected with the  river-system, and if so,  what should the  s t ruc ture  of t h e  con- 
nection be? A certain confusion reigns on these questions in t he  cu r r en t  state of 
negotiation research .  Often, in qualitative case-oriented monographs, problem- 
related and negotiation-related processes are loosely intertwined, decisions of 
negotiators being at t r ibuted alternatively to f ac to r s  in t he  problem and to t he  
relations with the  opponent. In theoretical research ,  t he  emphasis is, more often 
than not, on t h e  s t ruc tu re  of t he  problem shaping up t h e  negotiation, t h e  subtleties 
of tactics and of the  human factors being reduced through more o r  less radical 
preference hypotheses. The process  and system paradigms tolerate a lot of fantasy 
in dealing with t he  content-process issue, but they contribute little to structuring 
i t  in a productive fashion. 
In brief,  t he  process  and system paradigms a r e  good frameworks f o r  a post- 
mortem or a s ta t ic  description of negotiation. But they suffer  s t ruc tura l  limita- 
tions when i t  comes to bridging t h e  practice-research gap with respec t  t o  
preparation of action or to clarifying the  ambiguity between negotiation process  
and negotiated problem. To overcome these limitations, t he  field and game para- 
digms as discussed below are eminent candidates. 
The field paradigm 
While t h e  mechanism, process  and system paradigms represen t  largely a n  
attempt to c a r r y  ove r  basic problem-structurations f r o m  the  bio-physico-chemical 
sciences to t he  social sciences, field is a paradigm tha t  is  mostly developed and 
applied in the  la t ter .  The emphasis of the  field paradigm is on context. The image 
is that  of a space ;i. ... in which different location, or situations have specific 
character is t ics  in terms of cer ta in  a t t r ibutes;  actors in these situations will find 
themselves in specific contexts with a bearing on the i r  actions, thoughts, communi- 
cations, etc ... The field, however, does not determine actions or communication: i t  
gives them a meaning (8). 
In negotiation r e sea rch ,  a good point of application of t he  field paradigm is  
cultural research :  how are similar moves differently interpreted by negotiators 
situated differently in the  cultural field (in different social classes as f o r  
instance) or in different cultural fields (in different civilizations for instance)? 
How, in the  same actual  context, do similar intentions and perceptions lead to dif- 
fe ren t  actions and communication? Also based on t h e  field paradigm is  negotiation 
research  focusing on perception, and interventions to improve negotiation which 
are based on reframing, t ha t  is, a modification of the  way the participants per-  
ceive the  s t ruc tu re  of t h e  situation. 
In t e r m s  of field, action is  not understood so much in t e r m s  of i ts  results,  but 
r a t h e r  of i t s  intentions, of i ts  conception, of t he  meaning of i ts  context, of i ts  
preparation. Field is  a unique paradigm fo r  both r e sea rche r s  and pract i t ioners  to 
understand the  situation of a negotiator, and what i t  implies in designing communi- 
cation and action. 
However, the  paradigm has  i t s  own limitations. I t  enlightens t he  ecology of 
action and communication, but does not address  t he i r  consequences, o r  only 
indirectly, as they are - or are not - perceived by the  actors. I t  illuminates t he  
content of negotiation, but veils t he  objectivity of the problem being negotiated. I t  
clarifies t he  process-content ambiguity, s o  t o  speak, by evacuating t h e  content: all 
becomes perception and communication. There is no reali ty of problems beyond 
what actors perceive as such. 
This has  a bearing on ou r  o t h e r  preoccupation: t he  practice- r e sea rch  gap. 
On the  one hand, t he  field paradigm helps bridge t he  gap by providing a good basis 
f o r  practit ioners and r e sea rche r s  to discuss the  labile contents of action, percep- 
tions, situations and perspectives,  beyond the  operational aspects  of a negotiation. 
But, pract i t ioners  do  have, often enough, operational preoccupations: action 
demands, from the i r  perspective,  tha t  one considers t h e r e  is a real i ty  on which t o  
act: a r iver ,  a forest ,  a demography, etc. ... Social science, when res t r ic ted  to 
perceptions and meanings (i.e., to t h e  field paradigm) tends to aggravate  practi-  
t ioners,  and has  met ove r  and ove r  again with difficulties in use. 
So  the  field paradigm complements t he  t h r e e  previous ones both in terms of 
process-content relation. and of t he  communication between r e sea rche r s  and prac- 
t i t ioners over  t he  preparat ion of action. But it still suffers  s eve re  limitations 
which might b e  overcome by an  analytical framework integrating t h e  mechanisms- 
process-system and the  field perspectives. The game paradigm can  provide such 
an analytical framework. 
In negotiation research .  and in o the r  re la ted areas as well, t he  image of a 
game, and t h e  use of concepts re la ted t o  t he  game paradigm are quite pervasive. 
First, abs t rac t ,  theoret ical  r e sea rch  on negotiation. decision-making, policy- 
making, r e so r t s  often to a n  analysis of situations in terms of games. This is  t r u e  of 
course of game theory. But i t  is also t r u e  in a m o r e  implicit way of o the r  
approaches,  like decision analysis fo r  instance. A decision tree is  based on t h e  
assumption tha t  decision-making in rea l  life is s t ructured in t he  same way i t  is at a 
c a r d  o r  roulette table: t o  assess  probability and value of gains associated with 
different strategies,  and t o  play accordingly. Incidentally, the  concept of 
mathematical expectation, on which decision analysis rel ies  w a s  proposed by the  
17th century French mathematician and philosopher Pascal t o  help his gambling 
friends ref lect  on t h e  more basic choices in t he i r  personal life. 
Second, experimental research  in the  field rel ies  heavily on simulations. Be 
they quantitative o r  qualitative in orientation these simulations r e s t  on stylized 
negotiation situations which a r e  staged, leading to  the  organization of what a r e  
really simulation games. 
Third, in the i r  daily reflections and discussions, which s t ruc ture  largely the i r  
perception of t he i r  own experience, practit ioners use consistently metaphors 
which descr ibe the i r  pract ice in terms of games, using expressions like; "stakes", 
"winner and loser", "rules of t he  game", "moves", etc. 
However, t h e r e  is  as yet  no general analysis integrating these various uses of 
game concepts into a general framework comparable, f o r  instance, with systems 
analysis, even taking into account t he  ambiguities, diversities, and contradictions 
which exist  in t h e  la t ter .  In the  more quantitative approaches t o  games, only a f e w  
simpler kinds of games are involved. They are also t rea ted  in a way tha t  reduces 
the  specificity of the  game situation, through strong hypotheses on the  rationality 
of actors ,  o r  through a probabilistic treatment of uncertainty. Game theory, f o r  
instance, is  f a r  from an extensive, multidisciplinary and coherent  use of the  game 
paradigm such as is envisaged here .  Experimental simulations s t r ive  t o  discover, 
through the  manipulation of various parameters,  what determines the  negotiators' 
behavior. Although the  experimental setup is a game, i ts exploitation pertains  
clearly t o  t he  mechanisms- process-system paradigm. Gaming r e s t s  on a very 
heteroclitous a r r a y  of definitions and theories  of games. 
This is  not the  place to  discuss t he  various existing theoretical approaches of 
the  game concept, o r  t o  introduce detailed elements of a new approach. I t  should 
be enough h e r e  t o  retain in sho r t  those elements which re la te  t o  t he  use of game as 
a basic paradigm f o r  negotiation and o the r  s t rategic  action situations. I t  should be 
noted, in par t icular ,  tha t  existing conceptions of games stop shor t  of a s tep  which 
is  necessary f o r  t h e  game paradigm t o  be  exploited systematically. I t  is  t o  see tha t  
the  concept applies t o  r ea l  life social phenomena -a tr ia l ,  a firm, a negotiation, ...- 
and not only t o  t he i r  simulated, stylized o r  modelled representations.  This more 
extensive use of the  concept requires  a discussion of the  issue of "seriousness" in 
games. Actually, a s  i t  is presently used, the  game concept is somewhat ambiguous. 
I t  i s  used: 
- to point at what separa tes  fun games from the  serious situations of real life 
("this is  serious,  this is not a game"), 
- to point at t he  element of fun and playful involvement which can  exist  even in 
the  most serious situations ("I enjoyed playing stupid as a tact ic  in this  nego- 
tiation"), 
- to point at the  fundamental s t ruc tures  tha t  fun games and social life have in 
common ("rules of t he  game, moves, winners and losers  in elections"). 
I t  is this  last meaning which must be  retained here:  tha t  the  ser ious games of 
r ea l  life, t he i r  simulations f o r  training and research ,  and the  fun games of s p a r e  
time sha re  a common s t ruc ture ,  which is  t h e  game paradigm. 
What is this  s t ruc ture?  What kind of very general basic framework does think- 
ing in terms of game provide f o r  t he  negotiation issue? 
The example of simulation games suggests t h e  following basis f o r  a n  answer. 
Such games involve t w o  layers: 
- the  "accounting system" - or "institutional model", which is  t he  set of ru les  
which governs t h e  outcomes of t h e  players' moves 
- the  behavior of players,  and the  communication between them, outside of t h e  
formal codes of the  accounting system. 
How does cu r r en t  negotiation r e sea rch  address  these t w o  levels in t he  simu- 
lat&d or real "negotiation games"? A s  i t s  name indicates, t he  accounting system 
can  be very well represen ted  in t e r m s  of t he  mechanism-process-system para- 
digms. Actually, most work on games and on negotiation deals with this  layer  of 
negotiation. 
The behavioural l ayer  - t ha t  where players  give t he i r  own meaning to t h e  
situation, communicate informally among themselves, p r e p a r e  the i r  inputs into t he  
accounting systems ( that  is, t he i r  actions) tends to be  either:  
- reduced to insignificance or even non-existence through devices such as 
rationality hypotheses, 
- left  open by default or by a totally loose flow of qualitative comments; 
- separated from the  system level. 
The f i r s t  two att i tudes fail t o  provide intelligibility of many aspects  of 
player 's  behaviors, by not recognizing tha t  these are inserted in a field of meaning 
and communication which cannot b e  reduced to an  "accounting system". 
The third,  as discussed ear l ie r  about t h e  field paradigm, fails t o  propose 
proper  links between the  informal communication in a negotiation and the  opera-  
tional problems addressed by the  negotiation. 
So  t h e r e  is a second s tep  t o  take beyond the  cu r r en t  par t ia l  uses of the  game 
concept. I t  i s  to recognize tha t  t he  communication around t h e  accounting system 
(communication which is  the  essence of negotiation) is also s t ructured,  but cannot 
b e  understood fully in t he  same terms of mechanisms, processes,  systems. I t  i s  t o  
use the  field paradigm as t he  p rope r  analytical framework when i t  comes t o  mean- 
ing and communication. I t  i s  finally to ar t iculate  t h e  field of communication and t h e  
accounting system into a wider s t ructure:  tha t  provided by the  game concept. 
From the  above discussions emerges a basic, global image of a game as a sys- 
t e m  of physical and institutional rules  and constraints,  surrounded by a field of 
meaning and communication. Both levels are distinct, but interdependent in a way 
tha t  is not formalizable independently at e i ther  level. The moves of t h e  players  
can  affect  one layer  o r  t h e  o the r ,  or both distinctly. This image - t h e  game para- 
digm - applies both to fun and simulation games and to  the  ser ious s t ra tegical  
situations of social life, in par t icular ,  negotiation. 
How does this  view apply t o  a full-scale negotiation? A s  an  example, l e t  two 
countries again negotiate o v e r  t he  management of a r iver .  The content pa r t ,  
understood adequately in t e r m s  of mechanisms-processes-systems, can  be viewed 
as t h r e e  layered: 
- t he  actual  r i ve r ,  Nature, which will always escape total  description; 
- t he  r i v e r  as i t  is known through science, and handled through technology, is a 
physical "accounting system" through which a given set of physical actions 
will determine a given result;  
- t he  rules,  procedures,  economic dealings through which t h e  problem is  han- 
dled constitute a second layer  of accounting system; t o  a move, an  institu- 
tional action, they associate "quasi-mechanically" a given outcome. This layer  
is distinct from t h e  f o r m e r  one; the  "interactions" between institutions and 
bio-physico- chemical phenomena, if they exist  at all ,  d i f fer  fundamentally 
from those within each  of these layers.  But both layers  can be understood in 
terms of mechanisms (hydrological or budgetary), of processes  (reproductive 
o r  legislative), of systems (ecological o r  legal). 
"Around" these content systems t h e r e  is  another  layer  which is  both the  one 
crucial  to make a game, and to make a negotiation: a field of informal meanings 
stakes,  communications. Such a field is  at once both s t ruc tured  and impossible to 
formalize completely. Indeed, if i t  i s  formalized completely in a specific situation, 
and thus becomes predictable, then negotiators will have an  interest  to generate  
unpredictability and to diver t  t he  system, making its previous description 
obsolete, and so on a d  infiniturn. I t  or ients  communication and behavior, but does 
not determine them. It  can  be  fruitfully discussed, but never  totally accounted for .  
I t  will evolve with t h e  evolution of t h e  state of t h e  issue in a significant, but not 
totally predictable,  way. 
Different aspects  of t h e  field are r e f e r r e d  to by terms like personality, cul- 
tu ra l  style, competitive atmosphere, body language, good manners, and many oth- 
e r s ,  forming a quite disparate  collection. It  i s  t he  elusive material of social life, 
which various disciplines of human (or  social science) endeavor to capture .  
How does th i s  game paradigm relate to t h e  paradigms discussed previously? I t  
can be  said t ha t  t h e  content p a r t  is adequately describable in term of mechanisms, 
processes, systems. For  t he  bio-physico-chemical par t ,  t h e  scientists tell us  so. 
For t he  social system this will hold with a restriction: i t  is t r u e  as long as all one 
wants is  to descr ibe organization and the i r  mechanisms. But i t  becomes prob- 
lematic as soon as one wants to understand how they a r e  brought into play in actual 
practice.  The o t h e r  layer ,  t h e  play layer  has  then to be  included to make sense. 
Things are more intr icate  at t h e  "play" layer.  Mechanism, process  and system 
paradigms will still be  used here ,  but on a different basis - t ha t  is, only with a 
metaphorical value. They will be  images ca r r i ed  ove r  from t h e  worlds of na ture  o r  
of rule,  to help us grasp  t he  elusive aspects  of t h e  social fields. But if they are 
taken literally, t he  salt of social action, of tact ics  and s t ra tegy.  is  lost, and practi-  
cal  value falls. A t  this level, t he  best  available paradigm is  the  field as w e  have 
described it  ea r l ie r .  
How does this  basic s t ructurat ion provided by the  game paradigm perform in 
terms of bridging the  research-pract ice  gap, and clarifying the  content-process 
ambiguity? In a game, players  and spec ta tors  have different but clearly specified 
roles. The spec ta tor  cannot par t ic ipate  in manipulating t h e  system, but he  partici- 
pates  in t he  field surrounding the  game: his comments create or modify significa- 
tions and in par t icular ,  t he  context of the players' actions, and thus, t he i r  deci- 
sion making. The observer  also gets  t h e  comments of t h e  players,  and thus i s  able  
- as the analogy with any game demonstrates - to  s ee  the situation from the  
playersB point of view, even though i t  may differ from his. Reciprocally, the notion 
of being a player in a game supposes a possibility of acquiring a distance to  the  
situation, of "stepping out" in mind t o  think as if one were an  observer .  
The game paradigm s t ruc tures  the  negotiation situation in a way tha t  supports  
both analysis by the  observer  and preparation of action by the  negotiator. Furth- 
ermore, considering the  communication field in the  negotiation, within which they 
both operate ,  observers  and negotiators can analyse not only what they see,  but 
also their  relations and the  bearing of these on the  negotiation. 
A s  f o r  the  content-process ambiguity, t he  game paradigm provides a neces- 
s a ry  clarification by allowing a c lear  distinction t o  be  maintained constantly 
between the part icular  mechanics of a problem, the  determination of procedures,  
and the  meanings in the  communication field around them. 
Here again, the  game paradigm does not just distinguish, but also articulates. 
The game is the  interplay between the  system and the  significations the  players 
at t r ibute  t o  it. I t  is  the unique human capability tha t  natural and social l a w s  will 
radiate  a field of signification within which ac to r s  will move in a way both f r e e  and 
significant. I t  is  the  unique capability tha t  w e  have of transforming the  elusive 
meanings w e  at tach t o  things into laws of society and nature,  and thus build a world 
of o u r  own. 
If negotiation is s o  crucial in running o u r  complex societies, i s  i t  not because 
of the  s a m e  qualities? What seems an  impasse of natural o r  social mechanisms, it 
allows t o  turn  into flexible perceptions t o  be  probed tentatively in discussion. And 
what seems a volatile agreement of opinion, i t  will transform into a contract,  a pro- 
ject, a t reaty,  a fac t  tha t  will then become p a r t  of the  social o r  natural systems, 
and acquire, so  to  speak, a life of t he i r  own. 
Applications 
A s  the focus of t h i s  pape r  is on paradigms, the  applications of the  game 
analytical framework will be discussed only very briefly here.  
A s  is  the  general case  with the  "sciences of action", in the  field of negotiation 
research  the re  is no lack of facts,  and no shortage of proposed interpretations.  
The difficulties m e t  are r a t h e r  in validation, in applicability of research  results,  
in the  use of practit ioner 's experience t o  supply material f o r  research  and 
training. These challenges in the  development of "sciences of action" r e sea rch  
are indeed problems in t ransfer  of understanding: 
- from pract i t ioners  t o  r e sea rche r s  (mobilization of experience),  
- from re sea rche r s  to practit ioners (application of r e sea rch ,  education and 
training), 
- between r e s e a r c h e r s  ("valid" knowledge i s  one tha t  t r ans fe r s  from scientist  
t o  scientist  with minimal distortion of understanding, and maximal accep- 
tance), 
- between pract i t ioners  (post-event spontaneous debriefing and self-training of 
practit ioners).  
What are t h e  perspectives f o r  use of the  game paradigm as discussed above, 
in these four  areas (of which the  f i r s t  t w o  constitute the  potential bridging of t he  
practice-research gap)? First ,  the  mobilization of pract i t ioners  experience f o r  
r e sea rch  and training purposes i s  increasingly recognized as important, widely 
used and quite useful. Done in a spontaneous fashion as in lec tures  or memoirs, i t s  
efficiency i s  limited however by the  fac t  t ha t  much of what makes a pract i t ioner  
effective remains implicit (because too obvious to him, or unconcious, f o r  
instance), and largely escapes t ransfer .  The pract i t ioner 's  tendency is r a t h e r  to 
underline this  or tha t  aspect  of his activity which he  considers as intriguing, origi- 
nal, generally overlooked, etc.  ... 
The notion of debriefing w a s  thus introduced, to mobilize t he  pract i t ioners  
experience m o r e  systematically. Doing s o  improves significantly t he  t ransfer  of 
understanding from pract i t ioners  to r e sea rche r s  (10). However, the  basic diffi- 
culties just mentioned about "spontaneous debriefing" remain, although to a 
smaller extent. This has  suggested to me the  use of t he  game analytical framework 
presented h e r e  f o r  systematical debriefing. I have used it  experimentally once 
already, leading to propose methodological tools to apply the  game analytical 
framework in debriefing pract ice ,  and to  suggest directions f o r  a more detailed 
construct  on the analysis of games at a theoret ical  level (as  defined ea r l i e r  in this  
paper)  (11). 
Second, application of resul ts  of social  sciences ( or "sciences of action"), 
and training of pract i t ioners  in these fields is notoriously problematic (12). In an  
effor t  extending ove r  t he  years ,  I have been endeavoring to synthesize t he  teach- 
ings of a wide a r r a y  of case studies and methodological studies on t h e  s t ra teg ic  
aspects  of environmental management. The aim was to tu rn  these r e sea rch  resul ts  
into a coherent  expert ise  approach,  and make it  available t o  pract i t ioners  (13). 
Main difficulties were t he  heterogeneity of t he  analytical frameworks of t he  stu- 
dies themselves, and the  difficulty to find perspectives general  enough and useful 
fo r  both observers  and actors in t he  decision processes. The last t w o  difficulties 
are t he  ones discussed at t he  beginning of t he  paper .  
I t  i s  this problematique t ha t  led m e  to t h e  development of t h e  present  analysis 
of t he  game paradigm. On this basis, I w a s  able  to ar t iculate  an  initial set of more 
or less empirically heterogeneous methodologies into a detailed and coherent  
approach to problems of st ra tegy and negotiation in environmental management. 
This provides an  example of t h e  possibility to build, f o r  a cer ta in  field of applica- 
tion, a specific game analytical methodology, based on the  game paradigm as dis- 
cussed in this p a p e r  (14). 
The t w o  applications just mentioned are a n  example of t he  renewed use of t he  
game paradigm which is advocated here .  If t he  analysis in this pape r  is co r r ec t ,  if 
t he  resul ts  of these f i r s t  applications fulfill t he i r  promise, i t s  potential to bridge 
the  research-pract ice  gap is important, and much remains to be done to t ap  it. 
A s  discussed ea r l i e r ,  t h e r e  are already many applications based on t h e  game 
concept, resting e i t he r  on an  empirical basis, or on par t ia l  theoret ical  formula- 
tions of t he  concept, such a game theory (see note 9). They can only benefit from a 
more comprehensive and systematic analytical framework. This can help improve 
fu r the r  t he  design of application (in par t icular  in gaming). I t  can allow be t t e r  
situating of t he  various analytical approaches to assess t he i r  potential, to discuss 
t he i r  relations.. So, by i t s  capacity to integrate  t h e  existing narrower analytical 
frameworks, t he  game paradigm is a good basis f o r  t r ans fe r  of understanding 
between r e sea rche r s  - t h e  third point in o u r  discussion of solving t h e  t ransfer-  
of-understanding problems in negotiation research .  But t h e r e  remains a challenge 
to go beyond this  integration of narrower paradigms. I t  will be,  in fu r the r  work, to 
answer t he  question: "how best can one understand a game a p a r t  from in reductive 
terms of mechanisms, process ,  system, or field?" I t  has  too often been assumed 
tha t  because simulation games are s m a l l  and made by us, w e  understand how they 
work. Whoever has  had to debrief a complex gaming session knows otherwise. A 
new understanding of games is needed both f o r  fun and simulation games and for 
life-size games. and t h e  f i r s t  will contribute to t he  second. 
A s  f o r  the  fourth type of t ransfer  - pract i t ioner  to pract i t ioner  - i t  has  
already been mentioned tha t  game metaphors are pervasive among "practit ioners 
at coffee-breaks and o the r  informal encounter before  or a f t e r  negotiations; these 
a r e  the professional equivalents of the debriefing of soccer  games as practised in 
dressing rooms. The analysis above provides a rationale to  continue this practice,  
and a challenge t o  improve it. 
Conclusion 
There i s  a Zen saying tha t  goes: 'When the  finger points a t  the  moon, the  fool 
looks at the  finger ..." If paradigms are like finger-positions pointing to  different 
s t ruc tures  and aspects  in negotiation, this paper  has  discussed and compared 
finger- positions f o r  the i r  respective merits. These were assessed mainly in terms 
of potential f o r  bridging the  practice-research gap and f o r  clarifying the 
content-process ambiguity - two main stumbling blocks in negotiation resarch .  On 
this basis, the  paper  has  proposed and defended a certain shift  in the  finger posi- 
tion: tha t  towards the  game paradigm. 
G a m e  metaphors are current ly used pervasively t o  underline this o r  that  
aspect  of negotiation; they also ground an a r r a y  of separa te  methodologies, from 
gaming to  decision analysis. But these rely largely on implicit o r  on artificially 
restr ic ted notions of game. A reexamination of t he  game paradigm shows that  i t  is  
wider than the  o the r s  most current ly used ones (like mechanism, process,  system, 
field) and tha t  i t  can integrate them. It  has also shown to  be  more relevant t o  the  
"sciences of action" - such as negotiation research ,  f o r  i ts  unique capacity t o  deal 
with the  practice-research gap, and the  process-context ambiguity. 
Using a game analytical framework more systematically t o  s t ruc tu re  o u r  
investigation of negotiation can both bring more coherence, understanding and 
applicability in some cu r ren t  theories and methodologies, and initiate new develop- 
ments in negotiation research .  The game paradigm seems t o  be  the  potential basis 
f o r  a more ample and coherent field of analysis than i s  presently realized and tha t  
could be  labelled Game Analysis. 
Alas, discussing paradigms is not an  immediately rewarding effort .  Indeed, 
while discussing points of views from which negotiations can  be viewed w e  have 
turned o u r  back t o  negotiation itself, and - fools of a moment - haven't seen much 
of it. 
While more detailed applications could only be discussed very briefly here ,  
the  resul ts  of the  effort ,  the concrete  and usable products of a more systematic 
use of the game paradigm, will become visible only as w e  tu rn  around and look a t  
what the  newly positioned finger shows us. But if the  analysis presented he re  is 
correct,  if the first applications currently being developed hold their promises, 
new perspectives in negotiation theory, methodology in negotiation study, and 
negotiation practice and case description are  bound to develop. 
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